Abstract: Public-private partnerships (PPP) are contracts with a long-lasting period, huge relationship-specific investment, and great uncertainties. In many PPP projects, it is difficult or even impossible to write a complete contract that specifies all contingencies, so a renegotiation-allowed contract could be better than a renegotiation-proof one. Under a renegotiation-allowed PPP agreement, renegotiations can significantly influence the interests of both the private party and the government, so they have to evaluate the benefit and cost of renegotiations ex ante and consider them in the tender price. This study considers renegotiations as real options that are embodied to provide flexibilities for PPP contracts, and develops a model to capture the value of renegotiation based on real option theory. The model is proposed in three steps, including modeling underlying risk, bargaining renegotiation payoffs, and determining real option value. An illustration case is presented to demonstrate the applicability of the model. The case study shows that if a renegotiation-allowed contract is used, then (1) contractor-led renegotiation is very likely to occur, especially at the early stage of concession while government-led renegotiation is less likely to occur, and if any, it should occur at the middle stage of concession; (2) one party could use opportunistic renegotiation to hold the other party up and ask for excessive compensation, so renegotiations must be regulated; and (3) renegotiation in a PPP project may have a huge real option value, and the higher the uncertainty, the higher the renegotiation value.
Introduction
Public-private partnerships (PPP) have been widely applied to deliver infrastructure and public services around the world nowadays. Traditionally, governments provide infrastructure and public services through the following procurement methods: (1) a construction contract, where the contractor is solely responsible for construction; (2) a turn-key contract, where the contractor designs and constructs the project; and (3) a build-transfer (BT) contract, where the contractor finances, designs, and constructs the project. Since the late 1980s, a growing number of governments have delivered infrastructure and public services through a PPP contract (namely, a concession), where the contractor (namely, the concessionaire) finances, designs, constructs, and operates the project, and transfers the project to the government at the end of the concession.
The advantages of PPPs compared to traditional procurement methods include cost reductions, time savings, and increased social welfare. This has been verified by many empirical studies, such as Duggan (2000) and U.K. National Audit Office (2009), as well as the theoretical literature, such as Bennett and Iossa (2006) and Hart (2003) . However, the PPP approach is riskier than traditional procurement methods. Cruz and Marques (2012) summarized the reasons as follows: (1) high leverage, meaning high debt to equity ratio and high financial costs; (2) high sensitivity to demand risk because recouping investments is based on revenues; (3) great exposure to financial markets due to the large debt, and (4) vulnerability to political instability.
PPP projects require high flexibility to share risks between the private party and the government, so that the private party will not be frightened by excessive risks. In other words, a PPP contract must be an incomplete contract that allows renegotiation or a complete contract that is renegotiation-proof with enough contingencies. From an efficiency perspective, renegotiations would cause considerable transaction costs (Dudkin and Välilä 2005) , but also provide huge flexibilities in dealing with uncertainties (De Brux 2010) . Therefore, for some PPP projects with excessive uncertainties, a renegotiation-allowed contract may be better than a renegotiation-proof one because the value of flexibilities may exceed the transaction costs. There has been a sizeable amount of literature in economics concerning the efficiency of these two contracting approaches. The incomplete contract theory, pioneered by Hart and coauthors, studies the incentives when parties are impossible to write complete contingent contracts and ex post renegotiations are widely used to deal with uncertainties (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1988) . On the other hand, the complete contract theory believes that it is possible to specify the legal consequences of every possible state of the world, so ex ante contingencies are designed to deal with uncertainties (Maskin and Tirole 1999; Tirole 2009 ). In PPP practice, both contracting approaches are popular.
The complete contract approach is usually providing government guarantees, e.g., minimum revenue guarantee, and compensating the private party when serious risk scenarios occur. The compensation in serious risk scenarios is made according to the preset guaranteed values. The guaranteed values, e.g., minimum revenues, are designed based on ex ante cognition, such as financial viability analysis. The normal guarantees include minimum rate of return guarantee, minimum revenue guarantee (Ashuri et al. 2012; Chiara et al. 2007) , maximum expense limit (Park et al. 2013 ), minimum traffic guarantee (Brandao and Saraiva 2008; Galera and Soliño 2010) , land-capping guarantee, full toll guarantee (Wibowo et al. 2012) , restrictive competition guarantee (Liu et al. 2013) , and so on. Using these guarantees and types of compensation, the government shares excessive risks with the private party so as to increase the participation of private investors in high-risk PPP projects. Therefore, these guarantees have substantial value, which is accompanied by uncertainties.
By contrast, many PPP projects take the incomplete contract approach, in which the government does not provide guarantees but renegotiates the contract after uncertainty arises. The incomplete contract theory believes that it is difficult and costly to write a complete contract that specifies all contingencies, so a renegotiationallowed contract could be better than a renegotiation-proof one (Hart et al. 1997) . But critics have argued that renegotiation could cause huge transaction costs, so the selection of contract types is a balance between providing flexibilities and reducing transaction costs (Bajari and Tadelis 2001; Chang and Chou 2014; Soliño and Gago de Santos 2010; Williamson 1985) . In practice, many PPP projects used renegotiations. Guasch (2004) found that 53% of almost 1,000 Latin American concession contracts studied in the transport sector and 76% in the water sector were renegotiated. Woodhouse (2006) found that 61.8% of the 34 energy concessions studied underwent either mutual or unilateral renegotiations. Cruz and Marques (2013b) found that 67% of 87 Portuguese concessions studied in different sectors were renegotiated. The normal renegotiation types include government direct subsidy, additional toll increase, contract extension, tax waiver, decreasing performance requirement of facilities/services, and reduction or delay on preagreed investment obligations (Xiong and Zhang 2014) .
Regardless of the different contract theories, both guarantee and renegotiation are embodied real options in concession agreements and can be triggered by serious risk scenarios. Such real options could have huge values through exercising them and asking for compensation. Bearing this in mind, the private contractor can evaluate the value of a guarantee/renegotiation, in other words, the benefit and cost of a guarantee/renegotiation and take this value into consideration in the tender price. However, this kind of value cannot be easily captured by traditional procedures for investment valuation, notably the discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis (Ashuri et al. 2012; Galera and Soliño 2010) .
Many scholars have developed real option models to evaluate the real option value of guarantees. For example, Wibowo et al. (2012) used real option models to assess the value of land-capping guarantees, full toll guarantees, and nationalization, which are most widely used government guarantees in Indonesian PPP projects. Park et al. (2013) applied real option analysis to study the value of maximum expense limits in the privatization of a water and sewer system since these kinds of projects have stable demand but volatile operation and maintenance costs. Chiara et al. (2007) regarded a minimum revenue guarantee as a simple multiple-exercise real option and evaluated the fair value of this variety of real option in PPP projects. Ashuri et al. (2012) used real options analysis to price both minimum revenue guarantee and traffic revenue cap options in concessions and determine their effects on the concessionaire's economic profile. Galera and Soliño (2010) considered a minimum traffic guarantee in highway projects and evaluated highway concessions through real option analysis. Liu et al. (2013) regarded restrictive completion guarantee in PPP projects as a real option and evaluated the option value of the guarantee. These studies shows that the higher the uncertainty level, the greater the guarantee value.
However, to the best of authors' knowledge, there is no research conducted to evaluate the value of renegotiations in PPP projects.
If renegotiation is allowed, the interests of both the private party and the government can be influenced significantly. For the private contractor, the benefit is that the government would save the project by a contractor-initiated renegotiation once the project is in a serious risk scenario, and the cost is that the government would ask for a share of surplus profit through a government-initiated renegotiation if the project experiences extremely favorable conditions. It is obvious that such renegotiations are real options that can be triggered in the future and cause significant benefits to option holders. On the other hand, such renegotiations also have costs for option providers. In order to capture the benefit and cost of renegotiation, real option models, which have been widely used to evaluate guarantees, are borrowed.
However, there is a difference between the real option models of guarantee and renegotiation. The exercised compensation for a guarantee is up to the guaranteed level, which is specified in concession agreements, but the exercised compensation for renegotiation depends on the bargaining game between the private party and the government at the time point of renegotiation. In real option guarantee models, the real option value of a guarantee solely depends on the volatility of uncertainty, so the core issues of these models are to simulate the uncertainty of a PPP project and determine the option strategy that would be exercised so as to get the highest option value. In renegotiation cases, the real option value of a renegotiation is dynamic because it depends on the bargaining game between the private party and the government while the bargaining equilibrium changes with the evolution of the project's risk scenario. Therefore, the assessment of the real option value of renegotiation should be more complicated than that of a guarantee because there is another core mission: to determine the Nash equilibrium of the bargaining game in renegotiation.
Taking an incomplete contract approach, this paper presents a theoretical real option and game model to assess the value of renegotiation in PPP projects. The remaining paper is arranged as follows: First, the literature on renegotiation and real option analysis in PPP projects is introduced. Then, a real options and game theoretical model is proposed. There are three core missions of the proposed model, including modeling underlying risk, bargaining renegotiation payoffs, and determining real option value. After that, an illustrative case is proposed to demonstrate the model applicability. Finally, conclusions are made.
Literature Review

Renegotiation-Proof and Renegotiation-Allowed Contracts
The economic literature has held very distinguished views concerning renegotiations. The principal-agent theory (also known as complete contract theory) focuses on information asymmetry between contracting parties and argues that agency problems, such as adverse selection and moral hazard, can be resolved efficiently only if the parties can commit not to renegotiate ex post, i.e., via renegotiation-proof contracts (Dewatripont 1988) . A contract is renegotiation-proof if the principal will not choose to alter it ex post, given beliefs held about the agent's effort (Fudenberg and Tirole 1990) . Such renegotiation-proof contracts are usually designed by complicated mechanisms and with reliable commitments (Hart and Tirole 1988) . On the other hand, the incomplete contract theory suggests that renegotiations are not only unavoidable but also beneficial when the private company needs to make relationship-specific investments that are noncontractible ex ante and that become verifiable ex post (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1988) . Renegotiations are considered necessary adaptations to fill in the contractual incompleteness of long-term contracts and incomplete contracts allow renegotiations at any time during the contract period. In this regard, incomplete contracts are interpreted as renegotiation-allowed contracts in the rest of this paper.
Renegotiation of PPP Contracts
Generally, there are two kinds of renegotiation: contractor-led renegotiation and government-led renegotiation. The former occurs when excessive risk impact occurs and the private party initiates renegotiation to ask for compensation from the government to avoid bankruptcy of the project, while the latter occurs when a surplus risk premium occurs and the government initiates renegotiation to ask for profit sharing from the private party to prevent the private party earning surplus profit. Theoretically, the contracting parties can renegotiate the contract many times and at any time (Hart and Moore 1988) . However, conducting a renegotiation is usually costly and the freedom to renegotiate must be regulated. Renegotiation costs are usually regarded as transaction costs (Williamson 1985) . In practice, renegotiations are triggered only for particular circumstances, and the times and the timing of renegotiation are also regulated. For example, one party may only have one chance to initiate renegotiation throughout a concession and renegotiation is not permitted in the early stage of a concession (De Brux 2010) .
Previous research about renegotiation has focused on two perspectives. First, some scholars tend to find the causes of renegotiation and identify the most-effective regulation policies to reduce the probability of renegotiation (Cruz and Marques 2013a, b; Guasch et al. 2008) . Empirical data on renegotiation in PPP projects were analyzed statistically and econometric tools were applied to serve this objective. These researches show that some variables significantly influence the probability of renegotiation, such as the award criteria, regulation criteria, regulatory framework, existence of regulatory body, and impact of legal framework (Guasch 2004) . Secondly, other scholars were trying to argue which approach, out of a overwriting a rigorous contract or embodying a flexible renegotiation mechanism, is the optimal for long-term contracts (Hart and Moore 1988; Maskin and Moore 1999; Segal 1999) . Economic theories such as game theory were applied to analyze stakeholders' actions that maximize their utilities (Chan and Levitt 2011) . Their research shows that a renegotiation-proof contract through overwriting rigorous clauses is too costly and a flexible renegotiation mechanism of revising contract clauses ex post should be enabled due to the incompleteness and complexity of long-term contracts.
Real Option Analysis in PPP Projects
Real option theory is the extension of financial option theory from financial securities to real assets (Amram and Kulatilaka 1999) . Similar to financial securities, real options involve discretionary decisions or rights, with no obligation, to acquire or exchange an asset for a specified alternative price. Thus, real option analysis is well applied to evaluate managerial flexibility and strategic adaptability, such as deferring, abandoning, expanding, staging, or contracting a capital investment project under conditions of uncertainty (Trigeorgis 1995) . In traditional evaluation methods, such as the discounted cash flow method, the higher the level of uncertainty, the lower the value of the project. However, under the real options approach, a higher level of uncertainty can mean a higher value for the asset (Galera and Soliño 2010) . This is because managers can identify the gradually revealed information and alter their operating strategy in order to capitalize on favorable future opportunities or mitigate losses from unfavorable risks (Trigeorgis 1995) .
Recently, many researchers have introduced real option analysis to the field of infrastructure systems. Generally, two problems were successfully solved by this method. One is the evaluation of waitto-invest problems (Cruz and Marques 2012; Garvin and Cheah 2004; Kruger 2012; Smit 2003; Zhao and Tseng 2003) . In order to deal with excessive demand risks in infrastructure, managers can embody an option to expand in a contract and exercise it in the future when demand risk is low. Another problem is the evaluation of government guarantees in PPP projects (Alonso-Conde et al. 2007; Ashuri et al. 2012; Brandao and Saraiva 2008; Chiara et al. 2007; Cui et al. 2008; Galera and Soliño 2010; Liu et al. 2013; Park et al. 2013; Wibowo et al. 2012) . In these studies, guarantees were normally regarded as call or put options, in which the owner of the option has the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a particular underlying asset at a specific price in the future. If the option can be exercised only at the expiration date, it is called a European option; if it can be exercised M times on specified N (N > M) dates before the expiration date, it is called an Australian option; if it can be exercised at any time before maturity, it is called an American option. For example, Chiara et al. (2007) regarded minimum revenue guarntee as an Australian put option, in which the underlying asset is the guarantee and the private party has multiple opportunities to ask for compensation for the revenue shortfalls from the guaranteed level. Liu et al. (2013) took the restrictive competion guarantee as an American put option, in which the underlying asset is the exclusive right and the private party has the right to make claims at any time when new competition leads to a damage of future interests. In the present study, real option analysis is used to solve the problem of renegotiation evaluation. The underlying asset is the right to raise a renegotiation claim and the private party has one chance to exercise it at any time before the expiration date of the concession when a serious risk scenario occurs. Therefore, the option to renegotiate is an American put option.
Model
Assume there is a concession project with a length of T years, as shown in Fig. 1 . The parties can select a contract type between renegotiation-allowed and renegitiation-proof at the bidding stage. The difference of these two contract types relies on their strategies at different risk scenarios. Generally, five risk scenarios are defined according to the risk impact of risks (R). In a renegotiation-proof contract, (1) if the risk impact is intermediate (R ∈R), the private party is supposed to retain risk impact and continue operation; (2) if the risk impact is unfavorable or extremely unfavorable (R ∈ R þ ∪ R þþ ), the project goes bankrupt and terminates early; (3) if the risk impact is favorable or extremely favorable (R ∈ R − ∪ R −− ), the government builds a competing project to divert the surplus profit. However, in a renegotiation-allowed contract, two real options are available, including (1) contractor-led renegotiation: if R ∈ R þ , the private party could initiate renegotiation and the government could save the project from bankrupcy through some compensation measures, e.g., a subsidy increase, toll increase, or contract extension, so as to recoup investments and profits in the future. On these occasions, the government has faith in the remaining concession or has to suffer expensive losses from early termination; and (2) if R ∈ R − , the government could initiate renegotiation to share the surplus profit through some countercompensation measures, e.g., annual fee increase, toll decrease, or aditional investment request. The private party will accept such a renegotiation claim when they believe the risk scenario will remain favorable in the remaining concession or they will suffer expensive losses if a competing project is built.
In most PPP projects, both partners revise the operation of concessions periodically, e.g., yearly. The decision regarding renegotiation, either contractor-led or government-led, is also made periodically according to the operational situation. Therefore, the proposed model in this study is developed as a discrete-time option game, which can represent the timing of real decisions and then determine optimal strategies to guide the behavior of rational option holders (Smit and Trigeorgis 2012) . In order to build a theoretical real option game model, there are three core missions: (1) modeling underlying risks; (2) bargaining renegotiation payoffs; and (3) determining real option value. This study introduces these three missions in the next sections.
Modeling Underlying Risks
This study uses a binomial lattice model to represent the underlying risk in concessions, e.g., the demand risk. This method is a simple, discrete random walk model that has been widely used in the research of real option analysis (Ashuri et al. 2012; Garvin and Cheah 2004; Ho and Liu 2002; Smit 2003) . In economics and finance, the binomial lattice is a suitable random walk model to represent uncertainty that increases over time plus random noise (Ashuri et al. 2012) . In this study, a basic period length of 1 year is used to define a binomial lattice for underlying risks, i.e., Δt ¼ 1 year. The risk in year t is R t , e.g., shortfall of traffic demand, and the expected influence of R t is estimated as
where CFðR t Þ = net cash flow in year t when the risk impact is R t ; ρ = contractor's discount rate, which can be obtained by the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) formula (Cruz and Marques 2012; Wibowo et al. 2012) ; k E = cost of the contractor's equity; E = contractor's equity; k D = cost of the contractor's debt; D = contractor's debt; and a = corporate tax rate. In the proposed model, it is assumed that the initial risk is R 0 , and the evolution of R 0 is based on a multiple factor for the upward movement (u > 1) and a multiple factor for the downward movement (1 > d > 0). Moveover, the probabilities of upward and downward movements are denoted by p and 1 − p, respectively. If the annual volatility (σ) of risk impact is given, the binomial lattice model can be developed as follows (Ashuri et al. 2012) :
Therefore, the cumulative risk impact follows a binomial distribution as follows:
Bargaining Renegotiation Payoffs
As described in the "Introduction," the bargaining game theory is used to distribute excessive risk impact or surplus risk premium between the private party and the government. As shown in Fig. 2 Build a competing project:
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Þ is excessive risk impact or surplus risk premium; and x t and y t are the sharing of ϕðR t Þ for the private party and the government, respectively.
Firstly, the threat point E ¼ ðe 1 t ; e 2 t Þ [or E ¼ ðb 1 t ; b 2 t Þ] should be determined. A failure of contractor-led renegotiation usually leads to an early termination, in which the government compensates the private party and takes over the project asset. For the private party, the benefit of early termination is the compensation paid by the government (C), which is usually regulated by the agreement (HM Treasury 2007) ; and the cost is the value of the remaining concession (v t ). Thus, the payoff for the private party (e 1 t ) is as follows:
For the government, the benefit of early termination is the value of the transferred project asset, which can be calculated based on the annual depreciation of capital investment (D) and the contractor's discount rate (ρ); and the cost is the compensation paid to the private party. Therefore, the payoff for the government (e 2 t ) is as follows:
In government-led renegotiation, the government requests to share a certain portion of the surplus risk premium; otherwise, it builds a competing project, which is sure to divert a portion of operational profit. When a competing project is built, the payoff for the private party is as follows:
where λ = portion of diverted operational profit by the competing project; and v t = value of the remaining concession without the competing project. For the government, the benefit of building a competing project is the diverted operational profit, i.e., λv t , but it also needs capital investment on the competing project. Hence, the payoff for the government is as follows:
where D 0 = annual depreciation of the competing project's capital investment; and m = construction period of the competing project. The capital investment of the competing project can refer to the current project, and the diverted operational profit by the competing project is determined by its toll rate and convenience level. This study assumes that the competing project has the same toll rate and convenience level as the current project.
In order to determine ðe t Þ], v t should be determined at first. If a renegotiation occurs in year t 0 , the value of the remaining concession can be modeled based on the binomial lattice risk modeling as follows:
where E t 0 ½· = expected value at year t 0 ; CF i t = net cash flow in year t when the risk impact is R i t ; and pðR i t jR t 0 Þ ¼ pðR t 0 u i d t−t 0 −i Þ = probability of R i t in binomial distribution given R t 0 .
After the threat point has been defined, the solution of the bargaining problem in renegotiation is determining the optimal sharing of excessive risk impact or surplus risk premium between the two parties F Ã ðx t ; y t Þ. According to Myerson (2013) , the Nash bargaining solution of the preceding bargaining game is
Subject to x t þ y t ¼ ϕðR t Þ where s 1 t and s 2 t = bargaining strengths, in other words, the impatience factors of the private party and government, respectively. The bargaining game could have several rounds and both players consider the value of time, so both players prefer having an amount of payoff right away to having the same payoff later (Fishburn and Rubinstein 1982) . Thus, a discount factor is used to incorporate this consideration into the players' utility, and this factor is called bargaining strengh or impatient factor. In PPP projects, the impatience factor could be represented by the interest rate of the private party or the government (Shen et al. 2007 ).
According to Eq. (10), the following equations can be formulated: 
Then, the bargaining payoffs for the private party and the government ðx t ; y t Þ can be calculated as follows:
s:t: x t þ y t ¼ ϕðR t Þ As shown in Fig. 2 , given the total risk impact ϕðR t Þ (or risk premium), two parties' threat points ðe 1 t ; e 2 t Þ [or ðb 1 t ; b 2 t Þ] and bargaining strengths ðs 1 t ; s 2 t Þ, it is easy to determine the optimal sharing of excessive risk impact or surplus risk premium between the two parties F Ã ðx t ; y t Þ.
Determining Real Option Value
As discussed in the "Introduction," renegotiations of PPP projects can be regarded as real options for the option holders. In contractorled renegotiation, the private party holds an option to give up the remaining concession through an early termination or continue operation through a renegotiation. In government-led renegotiation, the government holds an option to either divert surplus risk premium through building a competing project or share the surplus risk premium through a renegotiation. Therefore, this study considers two real options in a renegotiation-allowed contract.
Similar to a government guarantee, a contractor-led renegotiation real option has a value for the private party and a cost for the government, which is determined as follows:
where y i t = government's share of excessive risk impact in renegotiation when the risk is R i t . On the other hand, a government-led renegotiation real option has a value for the government and a cost for the private party, which is assessed as follows:
where y i t = government's share of excessive risk premium in renegotiation. At the beginning of a concession, given the initial risk impact or risk premium (R 0 ) and the volatility (σ), the real option value of renegotiation in PPP contracts can be estimated.
Case Study
Profile Project A Project A is a toll road procured through a build-operation-transfer contract in 2005. The planned concession is 30 years, including a five-year construction period and a 25-year operation period. There is tremendous uncertainty with the project, mainly the demand risk, so a toll adjustment mechanism was prespecified in the agreement. However, it was revealed very soon that the actual traffic was much lower than the estimated minimum traffic and the toll adjustment mechanism was triggered for several times. Consequently, the toll rate of Project A was much higher than that of competitive roads in the same region and the unbalanced traffic distribution was getting very serious. Since the agreement did not consider situations for renegotiation, both parties were stuck in solving the problem. Therefore, the authors wondered if it would be better to design the agreement of Project A as a renegotiation-allowed contract, rather than a renegotiation-proof one. The proposed real option model in this study can be used to compare the value of the two different contracting approaches in Project A.
The total capital cost of Project A is $7 billion, among which $4 billion is senior debt and $3 billion is equity. The interest rate of loan is 8%, the risk-free interest rate (the return rate of government bonds) is 5%, the cost of equity, i.e., the equity internal rate of return (IRR), is 15.4%, and the corporate tax rate is 25%. Using Eq. (2), the discount rate is calculated as ρ ¼ 10%. The operation and maintenance (O&M) cost of Project A is identified as increasing from $190 million per year with a growth rate of 4%. The toll rate (average toll rate of all vehicle types by weight of their traffic volumes) is set as $30 per vehicle at the begaining, and then increases by $10 for each of the 5 years.
The traffic demand of Project A is estimated by referencing to competitive roads in the same region. Assume that the initial daily traffic demand R 0 follows a triangular distribution, the historical data of traffic demand in competitive roads are used and traffic experts' opinions are also considered to estimate the distribution function. It is found that the triangular distribution has a lower limit of a ¼ 23,000 vehicles per day, a upper limit of b ¼ 76,000 vehicles per day, and a most likely value of c ¼ 52,000 vehicles per day. The traffic capacity of Project A is 180,000 vehicles per day. The long-term traffic growth rate is estimated as 11.5% (Years 6-10), 3.6% (Year 11-15), and 1.8% (Years 16-end). The volatility of traffic demand is estimated as σ ¼ 10% and the probability of increase factor p ¼ 0.6. At the base of previous assumptions, the financial estimation is conducted as Table 1 . Using a discount rate ρ ¼ 10%, the lower limit of accumulative net present value (NPV) is −$702.75 million, the upper limit is $3,023.04 million, and the most likely value is $137.64 million. The host government and the private party have two distinguished approaches to design the contract of Project A.
Approach A: Renegotiation-Allowed Contract
The underlying principle is that a contractor-led renegotiation is applicable if the actual traffic demand is lower than the lower traffic limit but not over 25% (R ∈ R þ ), while a government-led renegotiation is applicable if the actual traffic demand is higher than the upper traffic limit but lower than the traffic capacity (R ∈ R − ). Both contractor-led renegotiation and government-led renegotiation can be applied only one time in the entire concession. If the actual traffic demand is lower than the lower traffic limit over 25% (R ∈ R þþ ), early termination is applicable. After the government pays compensation to the private party, then the project becomes free to the public. The compensation for early termination of Project A in year t follows the following method: the compensation equals the NPV of future net cash flows, and the future net cash flow equals the actual net cash flow in year t. Hence, the expected payoffs for the private party and government are estimated as follows:
where CF t = actual net cash flow. On the other hand, if the actual traffic demand is higher than the traffic capacity of project A (R ∈ R −− ), a competing project will be built in the same region to divert overloaded traffic from Project A. Assuming a competing project with the same capital investment, construction period, O&M cost, and toll rate as those of Project A is determined to be built, it is reasonable to assume that the total traffic demand will be shared equally by these two projects after 5 years, and so will be the future net cash flow (CF t ). Therefore, λ ¼ 0.5.
Approach B: Renegotiation-Proof Contract
In this approach, if the actual traffic demand is lower than the lower traffic limit (R ∈ R þ ∪ R þþ ), early termination is applicable.
The compensation of Project A also follows the compensation method as mentioned in Approach A. On the other hand, if the actual traffic demand is higher than the upper traffic limit (R ∈ R − ∪ R −− ), a competing project will be built and the payoffs are calculated similarly like in Approach A.
Model Application
Firstly, using Eq. (3), the expected growth rates and volatilities are used to compute the binomial lattice parameters for risk modeling: u ¼ 1.11 and d ¼ 0.90. The bionomial lattice evolution of daily traffic demand is then conputed by Monte Carlo simulation, as shown in Fig. 3 . After that, the probabilities of different risk scenarios are calculated based on the binomial distribution of traffic demand using Eq. (4). The probability of the risk scenario for R 0 ¼ c is shown in Fig. 4 . Fig. 4 shows that the occurence of contractor-led renegotiation (R ∈ R þ ) is high and the average probability throughout the whole concession is around 0.6. The long-term trend shows that the occurence of contractor-led renegotiation increases fast at the early concession period and reaches a peak at Year 5, and after that decreases gradually with slightly fluctuations. It is also shown that the occurrence of government-led renegotiation (R ∈ R − ) is low and the average probability throughout the whole concession period is below 0.1. The long-term trend shows that the occurence of government-led renegotiation is zero before Year 8, and then increases gradually. But after Year 20, even though the probability is not zero, the government will not build a competing project because the construction cannot be finished in five years. Therefore, it can be concluded that contractor-led renegotiation is very likely to occur, especially at the early stage of concession. Meanwhile, government-led renegotiation is less likely to occur, and if any, should occur at the middle stage of concession. This result is consistent with an emperical research of Guasch (2004) , which shows that the average time from award to renegotiation is 3.1 years (Year 4.1 in Fig. 4) .
Secondly, based on the computed bionomial lattice evolution of traffic demand, the bargaining power of renegotiation, including the payoffs in early termination e 1 t and e 2 t for R ∈ R þ and the payoffs after building competing project b 1 t and b 2 t for R ∈ R − , are determined according to Eqs. (5)- (9). The bargaining strength uses the interest rate of the private party and the government, so s ð18Þ
As shown in Table 2 , the bargaining payoffs, i.e., the sharing of excessive risk impact or surplus risk premium, are illustrated. Generally, there are three scenarios: 1. Believable renegotiation, as shown in bold text in Table 2 . In contractor-led renegotiation, believable renegotiations have negative payoffs for both the private party and government. The negative payoffs for the government means the compensation of renegotiaiton. In government-led renegotiation, believable renegotiations have positive payoffs for both the private party and government. The positive payoffs for the government means the profit sharing. 2. Opportunistic renegotiation, as shown in italics in Table 2 .
In contractor-led renegotiation, opportunistic renegotiations have negative payoffs for the government, but positive payoffs for the private party, which means the private party holds the government up and gains excessive compensation through renegotiation. In government-led renegotiation, opportunistic renegotiations have positive payoffs for the government, but negative payoffs for the private party, which means the government holds the private party up and gains excessive compensation through renegotiations. In practice, the hold-up problem in opportunistic renegotiations is verifiable to the third party, e.g., engineers, so opportunistic renegotiations could be discouraged by contractual measures. 3. Unbelievable renegotiation, as shown in normal text in Table 2 .
In contractor-led renegotiation, unbelievable renegotiations have positive payoffs for the government, which means the private party has to pay the government. Therefore, these renegotiations will never be initaited by the private party. In government-led renegotiation, unbelievable renegotiations have negative payoffs for the government, which means the government has to pay the private party. Therefore, these renegotiations will never be initaited by the government. Thirdly, the real option value of believable renegotiations in Project A are determined. Using Eqs. (14) and (15), the real option value of a contractor-led renegotiation for the private party is $800 million (t 0 ¼ 11), while the real option value of a government-led renegotiation for the government is $25 million (t 0 ¼ 14). Therefore, a renegotiation-allowed contract has a value of $775 million more than a renegotiation-proof one for the private party.
The evolution of real option value of both contractor-led renegotiation and government-led renegotiation are shown in Fig. 5 . It is shown that the real option value of contractor-led renegotiation for the private party increases fast in the early stage of concession and reach a peak at Year 11, and then gradually decreases to zero. On the other hand, the real option value of government-led renegotiation for the government is zero before Year 8, and then increases slightly at the middle stage of concession, but reduces to zero after Year 17.
A sensitivity analysis was also conducted to explore the influence of traffic demand risk on the real option value of renegotiation. As shown in Fig. 6 , with the increase of volatility of traffic demand, the value of contractor-led renegotiation increases very rapidly, and the value of government-led renegotiation also increases slightly. This result reveals that the higher the uncertainty, the higher the real option value of renegotiation.
Limitations
Assuming that a renegotiation-allowed contract is efficient to be used, this study provides a theoretical model to evaluate the benefit and cost of a renegotiation-allowed contract for both the private party and the government in PPP projects. However, a renegotiation-allowed contract may also raise huge transaction costs and not applicable in some PPP projects. Previously, it was unclear when a renegotiation-allowed contract is more efficient than a renegotiation-proof one in PPP projects. Therefore, it is important to compare the efficiency of both contract types and indicate their applicability in PPP projects in the future. In economics, a large amount of literature, such as transaction cost economics and property rights theory, has compared the efficiency of complete contracts and incomplete contracts, so many of the findings can be introduced to PPP contracts.
Conclusions
Renegotiation is a mechanism to provide flexibility and make up for incompleteness of PPP contracts. In some PPP projects, the value of such flexibilities provided by renegotiations may exceed the transaction costs arising from renegotiations. Then, a renegotiationallowed contract would be better than a renegotiation-proof one. If a renegotiation-allowed contract is used, both the private party and the government have to assess how renegotiation could influence their interests. In order to evaluate the benefit and cost of a renegotiation, a theoretical real option game model was proposed in this study. Referring to previous research on assessing the real option value of government guarantees, the renegotiation valuation model is conducted by three steps, including modeling the underlying risk, bargaining renegotiation payoffs, and determining the real option value. The case study shows good applicability of the model.
The uncertainties of projects, including demand risk, costoverrun risk, and so on, influence the value of renegotiation significantly. The uncertainty is modeled as a binomial lattice in the real options analysis. Generally, five risk scenarios are defined and the best strategies for them are identified. According to the case study, contractor-led renegotiation is very likely to occur, especially at the early stage of concession. Meanwhile, government-led renegotiation is less likely to occur, and if any should occur, it would be during the middle stage of the concession.
Determining the partners' payoffs in renegotiations is a typical bargaining problem that distributes the excessive risk impact or surplus risk premium between the private party and the government. The bargaining payoffs are mainly determined by the threat point, which is the partners' losses in early termination. Therefore, the compensation for early termination regulated in a concession agreement greatly influences the compensation in renegotiations. There could be three kinds of renegotiations: believable renegotiation, opportunistic renegotiation, and unbelievable renegotiation. Opportunistic renegotiations should be prevented by contractual measures.
The real option value calculation is based on bionomial lattice risk modeling and bargaining payoffs in all believable renegotiations. The case study shows that the renegotiation in PPP project may have a substantial real option value; the higher the uncertainty, the higher the renegotiation value. The proposed theoretical real option game model is helpful for both the private party and the government to assess the value they could gain from a renegotiation-allowed contract. 
